The cause for war

On budgets, freeloaders, and the allies worth having

For decades, the complaint has gone something to the effect of, “We (in America) don’t want to be the world’s police force.” Our strategic policy has been to pursue the model of a sheriff with deputies -- a clear leader setting a common agenda, with many strong allies to share the work as a posse. With this model in mind, we have browbeaten our allies to carry their own weight as defensive powers.

■ Some of that pressure has been rightly placed, considering the symbolic (if not literal) trade-offs between generous domestic spending on social programs and stingier expenditures on European militaries. The spending itself has a purpose, of course, but it’s also symbolic, sending signals about courage and willingness to fight.

■ Allies strong enough to be useful partners in a coalition arrangement are also strong enough that they ought to have well-ordered opinions about policies in their own long-term interests. Thus it should be no surprise that in the absence of a clear and compelling case for what to do about Iran, prospective allies are rejecting pressure to lend open-ended help to the United States.

■ Reminiscing about World War II, Dwight Eisenhower noted, “”[T]he American soldier, in spite of wisecracking, sometimes cynical speech, is an intelligent human being who demands and deserves basic understanding of the reasons why his country took up arms and of the conflicting consequences of victory or defeat.” Such a case is owed any partner in arms, as well as to the people.